Tests of hypothesis 1 are relatively uncontroversial; provided one attends with due care to issues of stochastic specification and datainstigated hypotheses, hypothesis 1 can be investigated through a straightforward application of traditional tests for absence of statistical correlation. More subtle is hypothesis 2, which I have investigated through two complementary methodologies, the first focusing on institutional and historical detail and the second on statistical evidence. In a separate paper (Hamilton 1982a ) I have examined the specific historical events and institutions responsible for petroleum prices over this period. I argued that the discrete, dramatic pattern of crude oil price changes in figure 1 is explained by the specific regulatory structure of the oil industry over 1948-72. Each month the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC), and other state regulatory agencies like it, would forecast demand for petroleum for the subsequent month and would set allowable production levels for wells in the state to meet this demand. As a consequence, much of the cyclically endogenous component of petroleum demand showed up as a regulatory shift in quantities, not prices. ' On the other hand, the TRC's sympathies were clearly with the producers it was meant to regulate, and the commission was generally unwilling or unable to accommodate sudden disruptions in supply, preferring instead to exploit these events to realize the dramatic price increases of figure 1.
The particular historical events behind such disruptions are sutmmarized in table 1. I argued that this list of factors bears little resemblance to the usual enumeration of key business cycle developments, and in particular it seems difficult to claim economic endogeneity for events such as the Iranian nationalization in 1951-52, the Suez crisis of 1956-57, the secular decline in U.S. reserves toward the end of the ' (1 982a).
1960s, the 1970 rupture of the trans-Arabian pipeline, the 1973-74 OPEC embargo, the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the 1980 Iran-Iraq war. My conclusion was that the regulatory environment thus acted to filter out many of the economically endogenous influences on petroleum demand and supply, with the result that the particular timing of' changes in nominal crude oil prices reflects largely exogenous developments specific to the petroleum sector. The second method by which I have sought to test for the endogeneity of' crude oil pt-ices is based on the suggestion of' Granger (1969). The institutional perspective described above motivates the maintained null hypothesis of strict econometric exogeneity of crude oil prices. This hypothesis has the statistically refutable implication that no other series should "Granger-cause" oil prices. More loosely, I would further assert that if' instead hypothesis 2 is true that is, if' some third set of' variables in fact caused both the oil price increases and the recessions then one should be able to identify unusual behavior in some of the key macro series in evidence prior to the oil price increases, which could have contributed significantly to the predictions of subsequent changes in oil prices.
A number of' asymptotically equivalent tests have been proposed for assessing such a contribution to prediction. Monte Carlo studies by Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1979) = 0 as failure to find evidence of' unusual behavior in these macro variables prior to the oil price episode and thus as undermining the proposition that some third key influence was common to both the oil price increases and the subsequent recessions. On the other hand, if' we perform a parallel test, letting z in equation (1) be the macro series and x oil prices, then I shall regard rejection of' H, as evidence against the assertion that the correlation between oil prices and real output is just a coincidence.
Limitations of' such "causality" tests are well known. The finding "x does not Granger-cause z" is neither necessary nor sufficient for a least-squares regression of' x on past x and past and present z to yield consistent estimates of' the parameters, nor does the statistical assertion "x Granger-causes z" say anything about x forcing or producing z in the sense that we might normally use the word "cause."2 I argue instead that the combined discovery that "oil is statistically infornmative about future x" and "x is not statistically informative about future oil," if found for a variety of' scalar and vector candidates for x, would indicate that (1) the correlation between oil and macro variables is not just a coincidence, and (2) no evidence could be found that the oil price increases would have been predicted on the basis of' what was happening in the macroeconomy up until that time. Such a finding, in conjunction with the historical analysis of' the apparently exogenous causes of oil price increases, could then establish the case for seeking a causal interpretation of' the pattern in figure 1.
II. The Role of Oil in a Simple Macroeconomic Model
As a starting point for this analysis, I examine the role of' oil in a version of the six-variable system which Sims (1980b) presented as a compact approximation to macroeconomic reality. This system includes two output variables (real GNP and unemployment), three price variables (implicit price deflator for nonfarm business income, hourly compensation per worker, and import prices), and a single series M 1 to represent the financial sector. My analysis also addresses two possible sources of' nonstationarity. First, oil prices have obviously been determined under a radically different institutional regime since 1973 than before. Restricting the analysis to the period prior to 1973 All data Used in this analysis are published in Hamiltonl (1982b) and are available froin the author on request. ally significant at the .05 level., The test f'or Granger causality running in the other direction, however, is again unambiguous; clear rejection of' hypothesis H.1 at the .01 level casts serious doubt on the proposition that the correlation between oil price changes and future levels of' unemployment represents a random coincidence. Domestic prices (H5) and wages (H7) turn out to be no better predictors of' oil prices than unemployment; the oil price series is clearly doing something substantially more than just mirroring the behavior of prices generally in the economy. It is also clear from hypothesis Ho in table 2 that changes in the growth rate of' M 1, sometimes asserted to be a driving variable in the postwar economy, did not exhibit any unusual behavior prior to the oil price increases. On the other hand, the data warrant rejection based on the eight-lag test of' hypothesis H1() that money growth rates were themselves unaffected by changes in oil prices. An increase in oil prices tended to be followed f'or the next year by slower than normal rates of' growth of' money and by faster than normal rates once the economy started to pull out of' recession.
The only one of' Sims's six variables to show up as individually statistically significant prior to oil prices is the change in import prices, and here only in the eight-lag regression (hypothesis HI I in table 2). Nor do the six variables collectively exhibit statistically unusual behavior in the year prior to the oil price increase (hypothesis IA I in table 3). However, the F-test is close to the critical value, and in estimating 29 parameters, this latter test is not especially powerful. It might therefore be argued that import prices contributed to a prediction of' oil prices in the eight-lag regression of hypothesis HI I in table 2 because import prices somehow captured better than the other five series the particular point in a business expansion at which excessive aggregate demand was soon to be mnanif'est in an increase in oil prices. I have tried to test for this possibility using an approach pioneered by Barro (1977) -Note that use of' the 5 percent level implies that for every 2() independent series tested, one will falsely appear to Granger-caUse oil prices. For the large nuLmber of series examined in this paper this woulId seem to stack the o(edds against the finding of' exogeneity. An alternative to classical hypothesis testing is to interpret the F-tests as a purely descriptive statistic of the usefulness of' the variable in predicting oil prices. Specifying a critical value of' 5 percent is equivalent to requiring the four paIrameters estimated f`or an added variable to increase the RY by 1 () over a fo6ur-lag aUtoregression for oil prices. I in table 2. other hand, the data fail to reject at the .05 level the null hypothesis that oil prices were influenced only by that part of import price changes which could not have been anticipated on the basis of the earlier state of U.S. prices and output; that is, the data admit the restriction c= c 0 = (, F(8,58) = 1 .78, p = .10. Moreover, even in a regression of output changes on four lags each ofV), u, p, wl, ai, and )", lagged oil prices still enter statistically significantly in predictions of output (H2 in table 3) and unemployment (H3 in table 3) over this period. I thus conclude that to the extent that oil prices were correlated with previous changes in import prices, this correlation is not attributable to import prices acting as a proxy for the general state of output or prices in the U.S. economy as a whole.
Of course, the possibility remains that import prices were correlated with some other unspecified influences that were in fact true causes of the recessions. There are, however, several reasons for doubting this interpretation as well. (1 (H5 in table 3) . Again, an apparent cause of oil price increases has been found, but, as in the case of import prices, it appears to be a largely exogenous influence and is not amenable to a thirdvariable interpretation of the oil-output connectionl.
Prices
While one may argue that the proximate cause of the oil price increases of 1957 was the Texas Railroad Commission's refusal to raise production allowables in the wake of the Suez crisis, it still might be argued that the TRC's desire to see prices rise was in turn conditional on the modest inflation of 1954-56. I have sought evidence of an inflationary "catch-up" effect by regressing oil price changes on the (not detrended) ratio of the crude oil producer price index to that for commodities generally. Hypothesis 6 in table 4 shows that such a variable does a slightly worse job of predicting oil price changes than did simple changes in the implicit business income deflator. While a catch-up phenomenon was surely operative, it seems unable statistically to explain the particular timing of the oil price shocks or, thus, the regularity in the timing between these oil shocks and the subsequent recessions.
Despite the apparent absence of unusual aggregate demand conditions prior to the oil price increases, the concern remains that oil prices increase when economic booms confront inelastic commodity supplies; recessions, for reasons unrelated to the commodity price increases, might then follow booms. The main difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that one should see a pattern similar to that in figure 1 Sims (1980a) has noticed a tendency for postwar recessions to be preceded by an increase in interest rates, which seems to have predated the decline in the rate of growth of the money supply known to be associated with the first stages of an economic downturn. I indeed found a positive correlation between oil price changes and the change in interest rates the previous period, though a test for statistical significance fails to reject the null hypothesis of no relation at the .05 level (hypothesis 13 in table 4), and the correlation is certainly not strong enough to explain the oil-GNP connection. Moreover, oil pr-ice increases tended to be followed by dramatic adjustments in the bond markets that would not have been anticipated on the basis of' the earlier pattern developing in interest rates, F(4,86) = 3.80, p = .007.
As final evidence against the assertion that some third influence both caused the oil price increases and contained the seeds of an incipient recession, I add the testimony of' efficient markets: hypothesis 14 in table 4 shows that if recession was incipient prior to the oil shocks, it was news to Wall Street.
IV. Specification Analysis
Precisely because the visual appearance of figure 1 is so dramatic, oil price changes clearly cannot be presumed to follow a Gaussian process. This has implications both for the probability distribution as- There are thus at least some aspects of' the relation between oil prices and output which are quite similar across the different periods. One might accordingly try to reconcile the two dynamic multipliers illustrated in figure 2 with a single functional form, interpreting the two paths as derivatives averaged over two parts of a nonlinear relation. However, nonlinearity is clearly not the only explanation for the discrepancy. Even though equation (7) There are a number of other factors which could also give rise to instability in a reduced-form relation such as (7). In late 1947 and since 1972, but at no time in between these dates, Texas oil fields were at 100 percent production. Movements in the price of' crude would represent fundamentally different signals of supply and demand during the regulatory regime than they would outside it. Likewise, oil price increases have sometimes been accompanied by contemporary accounts of consumer rationing; if oil prices have historically served as a proxy for such quantity constraints, equation (7) would falsely anticipate a contraction in output for an increase in the price of crude that might not have been associated with any physical shortages. Finally, to the extent that a deliberate monetary contraction is part of' the sequence of events subsequent to the oil price increases that led to recession, a change in this regime could also alter the effective impact multipliers associated with (7).
V. Conclusions
Seven of the eight postwar recessions in the United States have been preceded by a dramatic increase in the price of crude. What further can be said about this correlation in the light of the econometric evidence presented above?
1. There are few grounds for claiming that the correlation between oil prices and output represents just a statistical coincidence. The evidence since 1973 in itself' is sufficient to motivate a suspicion of a systematic relation between oil prices and output, and searching for a similar pattern in a different data set (1948-72) calls for clear rejection of the null hypothesis of no relation at the .01 significance level and, for some tests, at the .001 level. Accordingly, a systematic account of why oil price increases should have been followed 3-4 quarters later by output declines seems to be called for.
2. I find little support for the proposition that over the period 1948-72 some third set of influences was responsible for both the oil price increases and the subsequent recessions. None of' the six variables in Sims's (1980b) macroeconomic system, singly or collectively, exhibited any unusual behavior in the year prior to the oil price increases that could have been used statistically to predict the oil price episodes, and only import prices, which one might have expected to be the series least indicative of endogenous business conditions, were statistically informative about future oil prices based on 8-quarter lags. I further observe that (a) this latter correlation seems to be attributable precisely to that component of import price changes that would not have been predicted on the basis of' previous changes in U.S. output, prices, or money growth rates; (b) it is in fact those oil price changes that would not have been predicted on the basis of previous import price changes that are statistically infOrmative about future output; and (c) import prices could not by themselves have been used to predict the subsequent economic downturns. Moreover, the conclusion that import prices over the period 1948-72 were statistically informative about future oil prices was not found to be robust with respect to an alternative specification that perhaps relies on more realistic distributional assumptions. If' some third macroeconomic variable was in fact responsible for both the oil price increases and the subsequent recessions, its effect is not apparent in this small version of' the macroeconomy.
In searching a variety of' other series for evidence of unusual statistical behavior prior to the oil price shocks, I have found that the series most useful in predicting oil prices are, again, least likely to be regarded as key endogenous indicators of' economic activity. Inventories, capacity utilization, the Bureau of' Economic Analysis (BEA) leading indicator series, interest rates, and the stock market would all have failed to predict the major oil price changes over the period 1948-72. One likewise cannot mimic the oil price-GNP relation using wholesale prices generally, nor could a variety of' aggregate or specific commodity price indexes have 1)eefl used to predict the oil price increases. The two series which I have found to be statistically informative about future oil price changes over this period are (a) the aggregate incidence of strike activity and (b) coal prices. As in the analysis of import prices, neither of these series could itself have been used to predict the subsequent output declines, and it is again that component of each series that would not have been predicted on the basis of previous macroeconomic activity that is most useful in predicting future oil prices. This is not to argue that endogenous price, output, or financial variables had no influence on oil prices over the period 1948-72, even though that literal assertion is consistent with all of the hypothesis tests that I have undertaken. Undoubtedly the oil industry and its regulators were conscious of the erosion of the real price of crude effected through inflation and were anxious to make up for this loss at any opportunity. What does seem to be the case, however, is that historically these opportunities derived from events which truly were exogenous with respect to the American economy, such as the nationalization of Iranian assets, the Suez crisis, the secular (leclilie in energy reserves, strikes by oil and coal workers, and other economic developments specific to the energy sector. Insofar as exogenous events of this sort account for the particular timing of oil price inIcreases, the regularity in the timing between oil price increases and the subsequent recessions in turn becomes difficult to attribute to their common dependence on some third set of influences endogenous to the macroeconomy.
If the correlation between oil price increases and real output cannot be explained as just a coincidence or as just another correlation between endogenous macro variables, the case is strengthened for the third interpretation: the timing, mnagnitude, and/or duration of at least some of the recessions prior to 1973 would have been different had the oil price increase or attendant energy shortages not occurred. This is not to say that oil price increases are either a necessary or a sufficient condition for postwar recessions. In the light of the recession of 1960 and the oil price increases of 1970-71, they are clearly neither. Nor is it to assert that this correlation should be viewed as an immutable structural relation. Changes in expected inflation, the response of monetary policy to oil shocks, or the regime in which oil prices are determined could be expected to give rise to a different dynamic pattern. But what does seem to be true is that the post-OPEC( world has more in common with its predecessor than many might suppose. What is needed is not to abandon the demand-oriented interpretation of the fifties and sixties or the supply-oriented approach to the seventies but rather to resynthesize the histories told for both.
